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FINITE-HORIZON PLANNING AND OPTIMIZING THE RATE OF SAVINGS
This paper follows up the recent debate between S. Chakravarty and A. Maneschi

[ 2, 3, 4] in the International Economic Review on "Optimal Savings with Finite Planning

Horizon" with the following specific purposes:

(1) To argue that, in spite

of the arbitrariness involved in choosing the terminal capital stock, finite-horizon planning makes more sense than planning with an infinite horizon.

(2)

To

enquire into the nature of the time-path of optimum rate of savings in the model
in question, particularly as regards the bearing of the elasticity of marginal utility from consumption, 'v', on the question whether optimum rate of saving falls, remains constant, or rises over time.

While doing so, the non-disinvestment constraint

suggested by Maneschi in [3] is not interpreted, as Maneschi rather artificially
does, c:s imposing a lower bound on the choice of the terminal capital stock (as identified by the parameter 'g'); instead, the more usual and straight forward interpretation of the constraint as one delimiting the set of feasible programmes given
~

choice of 'g' is adopted.

(3)

To initiate, following the results obtained from

(2) above, a discussion on social choice of the parameter 'v', without a meaningful
rationalization of which optimum growth analysis may very well be regarded as a
game in abstract theory only.

1
1.

The Case for Finite-Horizon Planning

Neither Chakravarty nor anyone else has ever seriously presented the case
for finite-horizon planning, and the general presumption in the theoretical literature has, it appears, remained against it.

Now that Maneschi in particular

launches a determined attack on it, it has become necessary to present the case
for finite-horizon planning at its strongest.
Notwithstanding the presumption that a nation lives for ever; planning with
a finite-horizon makes more sense than infinite-horizon planning because neither
the production function nor the social welfare function can reasonably be anticipated for all times to come. 2

Estimation of the production function within a

reasonable level of significance is possible only for some finite plan-period,
However comprehensive (e.g., with technical change built in) the specification of
the production function may be, it is a natural presumption to suggest that the
margin of error from any estimation of the function would approach infinity as the
time-argument approaches infinity.

To put it differently, no estimation procedure

exists that will give us the production function at "infinity" with any finite level
of significance.

Hence, any specification of the production function beyond some

finite horizon would inevitably have to be arbitrary, and defensible only for abstract theoretical investigations but not for seeking guidance for planning actually
to be put in operation.
Even assuming that the production function could have been estimated with
reasonable accuracy for all times to come, or -- to think of a more credible 'if'
-- even if one could agree to some particular specification as a working "nullhypothesis'', social planners are neither in a position to know, nor to dictate, the
other major argument in the issue, i.e., the utility function of society for all
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times to come.

The validity of any specification of the social utility function

for any particular period of time must rest on the support, through the political
process of the day (not excluding a dictatorial choice by the political authority
of the day), of the generation living in that particular time.

If this fundamental

principle of "temporal democracv 11 is accepted, it follows trivially that the specification of the social utility function for any period beyond the lif~-time of the
generation to which the decision-maker actually belongs is beyond the latter's jurisdiction.

Nor is there any means available at present for anticipating the util-

ity function of societies yet unborn:

there is no guarantee of any continuity in

social decision-making as generations, governments, and key personalities in the
decision-making offices change, amidst changes in the complex of national aspirations
and international relations.
Social planners with a holier-than-thou attitude might consider themselves
nevertheless qualified to dictate the nature of social preferences for all times
to come and thus set sside the principle of temporal democracy mentioned above.
Even this would fail to salvage the case for infinite-horizon planning in the absence of any means of enforcing one's dictates on future societies:

notwithstanding

the dictates of today's social planners, future societies would behave, and dispose
of their resources, exactly as they Hish, constrained only by the initial endowment
of resources they are left to start with.
Here is really the most crucial argument.

For the type of aggregative planning

being considered, the only way social planners of today can effectively constrain
economic action of societies tomorrm~ is through the size of the terminal capital
stock to be left for the latter.

Thus it is pointless, if not inefficient, to as-

sume responsibility for the economic disposition of future societies beyond this one

3

single variable.
Thus

infinite-horizon planning, although fascinating as an abstract exercize,

does not make practical sense, and the lack of a general interest in optimization
over a finite planning-horizon in the theoretical literature is therefore to be deplored.

It is heartening on the other hand to note that practical planners on the

whole have re fused to be dragged to infinity and have stuck to finite-horizon planning without being the less wiser for this.
This does not mean that finite-horizon planning is free from :its own difficulties.
As Maneschi has already brought out, arbitrariness of a major nature must be involved
in choice of the terminal capital stock subject to which optimization is to be attained. 3

That it must be so should indeed be obvious, particularly when we note

that choice of the terminal capital stock vitally affects two parties, so to say,
'current' and 'future' generations, of which only one is truly represented at the
decision-making table with a choice before it which is therefore admittedly awkward,
But certainly the situation is not going to be helped by assuming that the p~rty
present is in a position not only to decide on the amount of resources to be left
for disposal by the other party, but also to dictate how the latter should dispose
of the resources to be thus left for them!
2.

Time-Path of Optimal Rate of Savings and the Role
of the Elasticity of Marginal Utility

With the attack on the finite-horizon approach out of the way, we ought to take
up more enthusiastically than ever the question of optimizing over a finite planning
period,

Neither Chakravarty nor Maneschi did really discuss this problem to a

rounded completion, presumably because of their pre-occupation with the "sensitivity question".

Specifically, the question of the optimum rate of ::;avin::;, tLe

4

title-issue of the whole discussion, remains untouched.

In this section we shall

be particularly concerned with this specific question.
We shall use the non-disinvestment constraint that has been suggested by
Maneschi in [ 3].

We however reject the Maneschi approach of implying from this

that the choice of the parameter 'g' has got to be restricted in an area where
this constraint is not binding:

such a procedure is not logically convincing;

rather it merely confuses what constitutes a feasible solution to the problem in
question and what does not.

If for lower values of 'g' than Maneschi's g* the so-

lution offered by Chakravarty in [1] violates the non-disinvestment constraint, all
we need to do is simply to reject this as not constituting a feasible solution to
the problem at all, and search for the best among solutions that~ feasible; it
is not necessary to disturb the pre-determined character of the choice of 'g' and
require it to be governed by the irrelevant consideration that the non-disinvestment
constraint should not be binding on the problem postulated.
Thus we keep the choice of 'g' entirely open in its whole feasible range,
namely, anywhere between O and b, to be determined only by (admittedly arbitrary)
value judgment of the social planners subj_ect to whatever political forces are present to constraint this choice, a consideration totally exogenous to our model. The
problem thus presented lends itself to a direct application of the "Maximum Principle" of Pontryagin and co-workers [5, Theorem 6]; the solution is identical, as it
must be, to that obtained by Chakravarty [ l] following the "classical" method in
the range of 'g' where the non-disinvestment constraint is not binding, i.e., when
'g' exceeds or equals Maneschi's g*, but is different when 'g' is less than g*, the
"classical" method failing in this case to provide the solution.
We shall not elaborate the detailed derivation of the solution here, but merely
present the final result for 'g'

<

g* in order only to complete the picture. 4

In

5

this case, the optimum time-path of capital stock consists of an initial "growth
phase" when capital stock would be growing, and a subsequent "stationary phase"
when capital stock would remain constant.

Both phases are non-empty.

During the

"growth phase" consumption remains smaller than income but is growing, at the rate
of b/v; during the stationary phase consumption equals income and remains constant.
When g_)g 7', the solution is already known from Chakravarty,

5

and it may simply

be noted that there is no "stationary phase" in this case.
We shall now take a closer look at the focus of our enquiry, viz., the optimum rate of savings.
shall call s*,

It can be shown that the optimum rate of saving, which we

(defined as the ratio of savings [= investment] to output), during

the "growth phase" has the following general expression covering the whole range
of admissible 'g'

(during the "stationary phase" where it is relevant s* is of

course zero):

1

b(•--b)t

sir(t) = 1 -

A

IL

where A is given, when g<g*, by

A

(a).
with
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equalling the length of the "growth phase", and, when g~g*, by
(b).

A

c=

V~1(::~e~:

)

It is easy to see that s*(t) thus obtained must either monotonically fall,
remain constant, or monotonically rise as t rises.

From this it follows easily

that if the "growth phase" falls short of the total length of the plan-period (i.e.,
when g(g*), s*(t) must be monotonically falling as t rises; for either a (non-zero)
constant or a rising s*(t) means a growing capital stock, and hence output, and
with this saving (investment) must rise further to give a rising rate of saving,
so that the "growth phase" will be perpetuated and cannot come to a halt.

The con-
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verse is not necessarily true, however, and what remains to be considered is how
s*(t) behaves over time in the case when there is no "stationary phase" (i.e.,
when g~g*).
v

<. 1:

A,
V/

Here, the following interesting cases can be distinguished:

In this case

i l - $)t falls as t rises, and the relevant expression for

given by (b), is positive; hence s*(t) falls as t advances.
1:

In this case

according as g

7-; £..

1
e(l - ;:;)t rises as t rises; on the other hand

AL
7

0

Thus s*(t) falls, remains constant, or rises with rising

t according as g ~

7v

It may be noted that the quantity b/v is always greater than the quantity g*
b
1
I- v
as given by g* = ii + T log~
b(-1v,-1).
where the second expression is negative •
.e...
- \I
To put the above findings together, optimum rate of savings over the course
of the "growth phase". always falls monotonically if 'v' is less than unity irrespective of the choice of 'g'; on the other hand, if 'v' exceeds unity, then optimum rate of savings falls, remains constant, or rises monotonically over the
course of the "growth phase" according as 'g' is chosen to be smaller than, equal
to, or greater than, the quantity b/v.

Yet another handy way of putting the whole

result together is to say that, given the choice of 'g', the optimum rate of saving~
monotonically falls, remains constant or monotonically rises according as 'v' is
less than, equal to, or greater than, the quantity£.

g-

3.

Conclusion:

Towards Rationalizing the Choice of 'v'

This, we believe, brings the whole discussion to a more positive conclusion
than where the Chakravarty-Maneschi debate left us.
theory goes.

But this is only as far as pure

For relevance to actual quantitative application of such theory the

pertinent question remains as to the choice of 'v', the elasticity of marginal utility from consumption, on which the character of optimum programmes depends very cru-

7

cially.

So far, no meaningful rationalization has been offered for choice of this

elasticity,

which therefore remains the weakest point in the whole body of optimum

growth studies. 6 It is time that more serious attention be given to this most difficult nonetheless the most important and fundamental question, if an explicit utility function is to be used in actual quantitative planning in growing economies.
By way of initiating serious thinking on this question, we suggest that the
results obtained in the previous section with respect to the bearing of 'v' on the
temporal behaviour of the optimum rate of savings be considered as a starting point.
Suppose we pose the question this way:

Given society's initial capital stock, and

its choice of the terminal capital stock, there is a given amount of savings that
must be generated during the plan-period to satisfy the terminal requirement.

In

what way should the burden of this "sacrifice" be distributed among the various
"generations" that make up the plan-period in question?

Presented this way, the

question bears a strikingly close analogy to the very familiar question in Public
Finance:

given the total size of required taxes, how should its burden be distri-

buted between various sections of the community?

Centuries of debates have brought

us to an agreement at least about the general character of this distribution that
l-<..S R.."t ui ·h:i \:i\e,_?
is to be regarded~as embodied in the Principle of Progressive Taxation. Can we not
apply this principle of inter-personal equity to the question of inter-temporal
equity as well?

If we can, then we really have quite an "objective11 guidance at

least about the general character of distribution of the reqbired amount of savings
among different "generations 11 ,

for the Progressive Taxation is a revealed behaviour

of societies as observed through tax-legislations of governments at least with respect to direct taxation, and is at least a revealed faith even if tax-systems, taken
as a whole, of certain countries fail to bear the Progressive character.

8

If it is permitted to borrow principles of equity from the interpersonal to
the inter-temporal sphere, and apply specifically the Principle of Progression to
the question of optimum savings over time, then according to the results of the
previous section an "equitable" choice of 'v' is clearly indicated as greater than
the quantity b/g (note that this necessarily means that 'v' should exceed unity);
for only then will a higher rate of saving would be imposed (a higher rate of "taxation", so to say) on later, higher-income "generations" than on earlier, lowerincome "generations 11 as the Principle of Progression would require.
us a lower bound for the choice of
that rises as a smaller

1

1

v 1 , given the choice of

g' is chosen, and vice versa.

1

This gives

g 1 , a lower bound

Since 'g' itself is a para-

meter in the choice of which considerations of inter-temporal equity (i.e., between
plan-period and post-plan-period "generations") is involved, it is not surprising
that an "equitable"
of 'g 1

:

choice of

1

v' happens to have some relation

rather this is what one should expect for consistency.

tion between the two has an easy interpretation:

with the choice
The inverse rela-

lowering the choice of 'g' implies

in a sense asking less sacrifice from plan-period "generations" and r.1ore from postplan-period "generations" for any overall growth rate covering any length of time
greater than the plan-period actually conceived; translating the same principle
(i.e., of higher progression) for distribution of the burden of growth among the
different "generations" ~vi thin the plan-period indicates a higher 'v' than otherwise.
The above gives, of course, only a lower bound for a rational (equitable)
choice of 'v', and hence a consistency rule of a very broad nature.

It does not

actually pin-point a rational choice of this social parameter that is crucial for
objectively determining optimum saving rates for a growing economy.

But the con-

siderations outlined above provides at least a basis around which debates about a
more specific choice of 'v' can follow, and thus takes us one step closer to actual
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operational use of theoretical optimum growth analysis.

It may particularly be

worthwhile to try and see if specific choices of 'v' can be deduced, following
the aforesaid analogy between inter-personal and inter-temporal equity, from
specific rate-schedules of taxation that have found general acceptance in polit-

ically conscious societies through years of mature social debates.
we reserve for a separate study.

This, however,

Footnotes

1
l".:m1e::.chi [ 3 ] , p. 109.
2

:sssentially this is an 11 uncertainty 11 argument, and one may feel that the use of an
"::.:~certainty discount" as is often assumed in the theory of individual decisionr:_ ~~:ing,
t3kes care of the issue without making it necessary to have a finite planning
bo::::-i zon.
This however J would be a confusion of issues, for two reasons:
(1) uncertc,i nty [:bout preferences of future generations is analogous only to an indicision .iri,
y}le;s own mind in the case of an individual decision-maker about what he may desire
in the future.
Such uncertainty has hardly been handled in individual decision-making
L!1~0~:v, and the only sensible way to handle it would be to have the individual con-·
ce,:ned lea,·e an "adequate" provision for the future to "reasonably" accomodate what
~~ raay desire later on when he does make up his mind; this would be an exact parallel
tn leaving an "adequate" terminal capital stock for future societies in social decisicn-making.
(2) An "uncertainty discount" in any case discriminates against th~
.tu:~_lll,~·
Such discrimination may be tenable for individual decision-making where disc~irnination is made both for and against the same individual (one's own self), only
at ~ifferent points of time; in social decision-making, however, such discrimination
will., except for generations not very distant to each other through time, would l.?.YQ.;1;.
:A:~~..£.f individuals in preference to another.
As a matter of fact, in social der:ic-ion-making, uncertainty about the future should give as much reason for having a
_'1cc,;_.-::tive:: time discount (cf., Sen [ 7]) as for a positive one, and this intriguing question would have to be settled before an uncertainty discount can be used in social
decision-making involving the welfare of both current and future generations.

3

w13t Maneschi has actually shown in Table 1 of [3] is that, in Chakravarty's model}
,vi.th der.umulation permitted, there exists only an initial area of "insensitivity"
·;hich must eventually give way to a later area of "sensitivity" while I g' is being
::_ n-:::eased.
It may be addedJ to complete enquiry of the "sensitivity question", that
(::) the size of the "initial area of insensitivity", which apparently misled Chakrav··
.:1:::::y into his rather sweeping "insensitivity conclusion" in [ ll, is inversely related
to the parameter 'b', and realistic values ·of 'b' can be conceived which makes the
former gic;e way to the "later area of sensitivity'well within the range of variation
')f 'g 1 that Chakravarty himself considered; (b) more significantly, even the "initial
'.1,.-e:i of insensitivity" disappears if optimum growth paths are subjected to the non::1isinvestment constraint, keeping the choice of 'g' open anywhere (unlike Maneschi).
:.:t can be shown, by solving the problem properly under this constraint as suggested
j_E section 2 of this paper, that optimum consumption paths are sensitive to variation
in 'g' significantly and in important respects
(in fact cutting one another on their
wc1y::; ::o the plan-terminal for choices of 'g' in areas where the non-disinvestment
sonstraint becomes binding on the problem).
It is this, (b) that really refutes
_1"'.haic.. .:warty' s "insensitivity conclusion" completely. Nevertheless, as it has been
~rgued above, the basic finite-horizon approach taken by Chakravarty seems to be the
only sensible approach to take.

Footnotes (continued)

4

The author has benefited from a discussion with Professor Ramesh Gangolly, now
at the Institute of Advanced Studies, Princeton, over the analysis of the "Pontryagin
equations" for solving the above problem. Responsibility for any inadequacy in the
analysis is, however, the author's alone.

5

An error in Chakravarty (1, p. 344], minor for his own purpose, by-passes the
critical role of the qudntity b/v in determining the time-course of the optimum
rate of savings: for 'g' exceeding b/v, 'R' is positive and not negative as Chakravarty .thinks it always is.
6

An attempt was made by Tinbergen in [8] to estimate 'v' empirically from revealed
behaviour of individual workers. Apparently it is the Tinbergen estimate of • 6
that was taken over by Chakravarty and has featured through his debate with Maneschi
(if so, it must have been missed by Chakravarty that the translation of the origin
by putting subsistence-consumption equal to zero, actually requires a transformation
of Tinbergen's estimate, according to Tinbergen's formula in p. 482; thus it is not
correct to say that C is a "mere translation factor" and 11 does not affect the maximization problem" as Chakravarty says in [ 1, p. 342]: it does, through specification
of 'v' ). Apart from the questionable mixing up of issues ipertaining to individual
optimization with those pertaining to social optimization over time, the present
author has found Tinbergen's estimation to be arbitrary, as it depended crucially
on the two particular consumption levels that he actually used to derive his estimate (this has been discussed by the author in a separate paper [6], which shall
be mailed to the reader on request).
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APPENDIX 1: HATHEHATICAL NOTE TO SECTION Ill
e=v
1.

The problen is to

i.e., to minimize

• 1-0
(bK-K)
dt, given

1.1

K (t) = u (t), the control variable, to be chosen for each point of
time within bounds r,iven by

1.2

0 cu (t) c bK (t)~

1.3

K

1.4

r(T) =

1.5

et l; in order for optimization to be meaningful.

(o) = K)o, the initial conditior.;

r?

=

K•

egT, the terminal condition, oc gc b;

t'ithout loss of generality, let K=l, so that
1.3a K (o) = 1
1.4a K (T) = cgT

2.

By the 11aximum Principle of Pouteryagin et ol (Theorem 6), optimization

requires u (t) to be so chosen as to r.iaximize the following Hamiltonian function E(K,u,t) at each point of time:2
2.1

H(K,u,t) =

1

~ e {bK (t) - u (t)}l-e

+w

(t) • u (t), where u (t) is the

shadow price of investnent and is tine-continuous, and its novement
through time under optimization is governed by the relation
2.2

3.

~

JH
= - JI~.
- = -b

(bK-u)

-e "'-.0.
/,

It can be shoon that the llarniltonian l! is a concave function in u, given

t and the time-path of K up tot and hence

1

See acknowledgment, page 4n.
Footnote 2 continued on next page.

1(

(t).

From this the following

2

can be said straightway about optimun u (t) {henceforth u * (t), denoting that
value u (t) that naximizes the corresponcling Hnmiltoni
3.1

u*(t) = o if ancl only if Lu(K,u,t) /-

< O

function H (K,u,t)}:

and

/, u=O
3.2

u * (t)? 0

i f and only i f Hu (K,u, t)/

>

o

u=O

3.1 may be said to give a ''corner solution", uhile 3.2 stands for
the "regular"

(classical) solution

3.2a Hu= t)i- (bK-u)

-e

=

for u* (t), as given by

O.

'I;

Note that u (t) never reaches the upper bound u = bK(t), for
bK = t!J-

oo,

a negative quantity , so that H must vanish before u
u

reaches bK.

4.

He shall now prove the follmlinr:
Theorem I:

. ever O. it is O the rest of the .plnnIf u* (t) 1B

period.
Proof:

Consider the time-path of the derivative H (K,u,t) on the
u

plane u = O.
this plane.

Since K = u (by definition), I~ renains stationary

on

lience, the tine-derivative of H (K,u,t)/
equals the
u
u= 0

time-derivative of

t)i

alone (see 3.2a), and thus (see 2.2) is a negative

quantity.
Thus, on the plane u = o, the expression 1-1

u

falls as t increases.

(K,u,t) monotonically

Hence, if for some t = t', Pe have H (K,u,t)/
u

/ u= 0

< 0

then

Hu (K,u,t~,./u =

2

o< O for

all t > t'.

ForT!lally, the ;:aximun Prir,ciple only p,ives a set of necessary conditions for optimum. In this particular problem, however, it should be
easy to show that an optimum does exist (i.e., the solution space is compact); it should also be easy to see that the relevant differential equation, given values of the relevant parameters, has only one solution. The
two together insure sufficiency.

3

This combined with 3.1 proves Theorem 1.

5.

From Theorem 1, it follows that u * (t) cannot be zero for t=O, for then

the terminal requirement 1.4 cannot be satisfied.
Hu (K,u,t)

Hence, by 3.2, we must have

I "

u= O ,,,,- ) 0, i.e.,
t=O

'

·tjJ(O) - b -e ."'
_,,..,-0 (see 3.2a and 1.3a), or

5.1

1/i(O) ;.,. b

-e _,,/
·,

O.

It is also easy to see that
1/J(t) is time-continuous.
Theorem 2:

Hu(K,u,t)/u=O

is time-continuous, since

Hence

There must at least be an initial phase that is non1<

empty. during which u (t) is strictly positive, and hence given
by 3.2, i.e., ll (K,u,t) = O.
u

During this phase, capital stock would be growing with time, and
accordingly we shall call this phase the

6.

11

growth. phase."
1

From Theorem 2, we have u * (t) = bK(t) -

phase."

1

a

Combining this with 2.2, we have t/J =

during the "growth

-bt/1, whence t/J(t) = tjJ(O)e-bt.

Hence, during the growth phase, we have
6.1

*

u (t) = bK(t) - B.e

b t
""8""

1

where

B=

1

{t/1 (0) }8
Equation 6.1 gives the optimum time-course of the rate

of investment

K during the "growth phase," yielding the general solution for optimum capital
stock, denoted by K* (t), at each point of time during this phase as
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b t
6.2

K*(t) = c

ebt + c

1

2

e

e

with initial condition

Solving for

c1

e

1 +

and
• B

c2

in terms of B, we obtain

1
= 1 + B,

and

b(l-9)

e

= -

Note that.

b(l-9)

6.5

1
B (defined in 6.4b) ~ 0 for 8 ~1.
Combining 6. 2 with 6. 4, we have

6.6

i' (t)

= ebt

+

b t
1
B (ebt - e1J ) during the growth phase.

lt

8
Note that 6.5 ensures that the expression B1 (ebt - e
negative, thus ensuring that the optimum rate

) is always

of grmJth of capital is always

less than maximum feasible rate given by the output-capital ratio Bconfirming
a result we have already obtained in ~ection 3.

7.

There are now two possibilities:

(a)

In this case u * (t)

The "growth phase" covers the entire plan period.

is positive throughout, i.e., the non-disinvestment constraint is never binding.
0

<

Thus, the optimum control is in the interior of the feasible region
u (t)

~

bK(t) for all tat least in the range O 2- t

the so-called "classical solution" where the constant B
determined by the original terminal condition 1.4.

<

1

T, and we have
fhence B) is

This solution is already
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spelled out in Chakravarty (1), and we shall not repeat it here. 3
(b)

The "growth phase" stops short of the entire length of the plan-

period, and is followed by what may be called a "stationary phase" which
runs through the remaining period (by Theorem 1).

This we shall call the

"non-classical solution," and, as it has not been covered either by
Chakaravarty or by Maneschi, we shall look at this solution more closely
below.
Suppose we have a "non-classical solution," with the "stationary
phase" starting at t = T<T.

Then in order to satisfy the terminal require-

ment 1.4a, we ~ust have K*(t) = K(T) = egt for all tin the range T~t~ T,
Specifically,
7.1

*

K (T) = e

gt

and this gives us the specific

'

terminal condition to

1
solve for B and hence for the differential equation 6.1.

Combining 6.6

with 7.1 we have

7.2

e

gt

•

Furthermore, since the "stationary phase" begins at t = T

u * (t) must

become zero for the first time at t = T, being determined up to this point
of time by the differential equation 6.1.
]?_T
have bK(T) = B.e 0 , whence

7.3

B

= bK(T) •

e

Setting u * (t=T) = 0 in 6,1 we

-_b.,.,,
b:r
gt-0 = be
0

Combining 7.2 and 7.3, we have the relation

3

Sei:;
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7.4

<P(t)

= e

hT

e

+

1 -

er,t-b("%-l) T - __..!__ egt = O, which provides the
1 - e

e

solution for T and hence for the whole system in the "non-classical" situation.
Obviously, if we have the "non-classical'' solution, then Tas given by 7.4
must be less than T.

It can also be shown that there is only one positive

value of T that satisfies 7. 4.

8.

4

We already have, from llaneschi in ( ), that the "classical" solution
~'c

satisfies the non-disinvestment constraint only for g~ g , where
b
g* = -

8

1-e

1

+ -T log c

b(l_- l)T
e

e

-·

- e

Obviously, then, we have the "non-classical" solution for g< g * •
can be shown easily that O <g*< b,

5

so that we have (Theorem 3):

It

the ranges

of 'g' for which the classical and non-classical solutions occur respectively
are both non-empty.

9.

Finally, the optimum rate

4

of saving defined ass * (t) =

u * (t)
bK * (t)

Since (a) <P(O) < O; (b) <f>(oo ) > 0

{express <P(t) as e

ht

(1

+~

6

0

C

b
gt-8 T)

-

1

--

1 -

e

-1

and (c) <P (t) vanishes only once for T>O.
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t,

Hint:

show that e(b-g

that g /\ 0, for all

6>0

)T>l,

so that b_>g, and also eg*T_;>-1, so

7

i< given by (fcom 6.1 anc~ 6.6)
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during the "gruwtL :'hase".

For th:! non-classical solution, this gives us

(see 7. 3)
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For the classical solution, it can be shown {by putting K*(T)= egT in 6.6}

,.

B = b(S-1)
0

whence

...
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APPENDIX 2:

ESTITIATION OF

I

v' BY TINBERGEt;

Tinbergen estimates 'v' by using Frisch's work on what Frisch calls
the "flexibility of marginal utility, 11

~r

The concept of 'v' differs from

the concept of 'w' in that the former refers to the elasticity of marginal
utility with respect to surplus (real) consumption t1hile the latter is
concerned with real income.

In the rough measurement of '.v' that Tinbergen

attempts the distinction between real income and real consumption has
apparently been ignored.

Assuming that 'v' is constant for all magnitudes
j

of surplus consumption 'z' (c-c in Tinbergen's notation) so that~= v.c/c-c
changes only as the ratio c/c-c changes, and assuming subsistence consumption
to be a constant, an estimate of
1

1
~/ ,

v

=

say

1

v' is suggested from any two estimates of

and w , as follows:
2
'cl - c2 \
(c -c )/ -.
•
1 2 . wl
w2,
w

1

✓

✓

With w = 1 (American workers) and w = 3.5 (French workerS) and c = 2c ,
2
1
2
1
as assumed by Tinbergen, the above yields Tinbergen's estimate of 'v' as .6.
,/

Since any pair of e's (and the corresponding w's) would yield one such
estimate of 'v', this procedure of estimating 'v' would be valid only if
the assumption of constancy of 'v' were empirically borne out, yielding the
same estimate of 'v' from different pairs of e's except for rnndom variations.
This, however, is not the case:

estimation of 'v' for different pairs of

-✓-

c 's with corresponding w's taken from Frisch's 1931 study shows a systematic
variation of 'v' with respect to different such pairs.
Tables A and B.

This is shown in

2

Table A
'c'

Table B

'w'

'v'

'c'

'w'

frOTTI consecutive
pairs of 'c'
6.40
4.52
3.55
2.96
2.55
2.25
2.03
1.85
1. 71
1.59
1.50
1.41
1.34
1. 28
1.22
1.18

75%
80%
a5z
90%
95%
100%
105%
110%
115%
120%
1251('.
1307,
135%
1407'.
145%
150%

.83
.80
.77
.72
.69
.68
• 6l1

.64
.60
.63
.56
.58
.57
.52
.60

'v'
from consecutive
pairs of IC I

2.40
2,62
2.90
3.17
3.48
3.80
4.16
4.55
5.00
5.40
5.91
6.50

.617
.559
.510
.467
.428
.396
.362
.333
.312
.294
.278
.261

.28
.28
.24

.22
.21
.18
.17
.19
.17
.17
.16

Table A shows the different values of 'v' that are obtained by pairing
consecutive e's (and corresponding w's) given in the columns of Frisch 1
as estimates from the Paris material, 1920-22; Table n 8ives the same for the
U.S. material, 1918-19.

In both these tables 'v' is seen to rise with

significant consistency as lower and lower consumption levels are taken, giving a range from ,52 to .83 for Paris workers and from .16 to .28 for U.S.
workers.

If we assume that the lm,est U.S. consumption level represented in

Table n was higher than the highest Paris consumption level represented in
Table A, and also assume following Tinbergen that Paris and U.S. workers.had

1 Frisch, R., New Methods of Measuring l~arginal Utility, Verlag Von
J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1932, pp. 32 and 64 (tables 2 and 5).
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the same utility function, then the consistency in the variation of 'v'
holds even if the two tables were combined.

The monotonic rise in 'v' with

fall in the corresponding levels of consumption gives us a reason to expect
that 'v' would have exceeded unity if still lower consumption levels were
investigated; this suggests that for consu1~ption levels pertaining in underdeveloped countries with which most optimal growth studies are really concerned, 'v' ,wuld in fact be greater than unity if it were to be empirically
estimated, following the above procedure, from data more directly relevant to
situations in these countries.
The more important point that co~es out from the tables presented above
is that an estimate of 'v' the uay Tinbergen does it would be as arbitrary
as anything, depending as it uould so heavily on the specific pair of consumption levels that are used for the estimation.

This not only means

that empirical justification for regarding 'v' as less than unity, always,
is not established; it also means that the assumption of constancy of 'v'
itself is not consistent with observed market behaviour of individuals.
This does not necessarily compel us to discard the constancy postulate
for 'v' in the social welfare function under study.

The social welfare func-

tion does not necessarily have to be that directly consistent, if at all. wi~h
revealed market behaviour of individuals or groups of individuals.

If,

however, the constancy potulate is retained, the possibility of estimation
of the parameter 'v' from observed market behaviour would not be in the
nature of things, and social choice of the value of this parameter has to
seek its rationalization elsewhere.

